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Complementary colors are color pairs which, when combined in the right proportions,
produce white or black. Complementary actions refer here to forms of social interaction
wherein individuals adapt their joint actions according to a common aim. Notably,
complementary actions are incongruent actions. But being incongruent is not sufficient
to be complementary (i.e., to complete the action of another person). Successful
complementary interactions are founded on the abilities: (i) to simulate another person’s
movements, (ii) to predict another person’s future action/s, (iii) to produce an appropriate
incongruent response which differ, while interacting, with observed ones, and (iv) to
complete the social interaction by integrating the predicted effects of one’s own action
with those of another person. This definition clearly alludes to the functional importance of
complementary actions in the perception–action cycle and prompts us to scrutinize what
is taking place behind the scenes. Preliminary data on this topic have been provided by
recent cutting-edge studies utilizing different research methods. This mini-review aims to
provide an up-to-date overview of the processes and the specific activations underlying
complementary actions.
Keywords: action observation, perception–action coupling, social interactions, motor resonance, transcranial
magnetic stimulation
Introduction
Motor resonance is defined as the subliminal activation of the motor system—and of the imitative
response—while observing actions performed by others (reviewed in Heyes, 2011). Gallese (2001)
explained that: “when we observe actions performed by other individuals our motor system ‘res-
onates’ along with that of the observed agent” (pp. 38–39). Numerous neurophysiological studies
have in fact demonstrated that a motor resonant mechanism is at work in the motor, premotor,
and the posterior parietal cortices when individuals are instructed to observe goal-directed actions
being executed by another or others (for review, see Fadiga et al., 2005; Heyes, 2011; Rizzolatti
et al., 2014). The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys provided the physiological model for
this perception–action coupling mechanism (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Located in the ventral
premotor cortex (area F5) and the posterior parietal cortex, mirror neurons were found to fire both
when a monkey carried out a goal-directed action as well as when it observed that same action
being performed by another subject (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Motor resonance appears then to
pre-activate the motor system of an observer in order to represent and interpret the movements of
another person even before the “go” signal has been given and activation remains for the most part
on an unconscious level (Costantini et al., 2011).
While actions that are observed and those that are being planned appear functionally equivalent
(Knoblich and Flach, 2001), it is unclear if the visual representation of an observed action inevitably
leads to its motor representation. This is particularly true with regard to complementary (from Latin
complementum; i.e., that fills up) actions, a specific class of movements which differ from -although
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interactingwith- an observed action (Sebanz et al., 2006; Knoblich
et al., 2011). In the case, for example, that someone hands us a
mug by its handle, wewill automatically, without giving it a second
thought, grab themug using awhole-hand-grasp (themost appro-
priate grasping posture in this particular situation). The types of
grasps adopted by the two interacting agents are incongruent, but
they are nevertheless appropriate and complementary.
As a working definition, complementary actions refer here to
any form of social interaction wherein two (or more) individu-
als coordinate and mutually complete their incongruent actions,
rather than performing imitative behaviors. In this respect, we can
define as complementary affordances all the action possibilities in
which suitable motor programs aiming to bring a joint goal to
completion are activated (such as grasping and offering a coin
when seeing an open hand in sign of request). Depending on
its posture and context, therefore, an extended open hand could
lead to a donation, to a handshake or to an infinite number of
other actions (Sartori et al., 2009). Activation of a complementary
affordance is an important social tool, and it suggests that the
automatic, rapid decoding of social cues influences intentional
behavior in our everyday interactions, maximizing the efficiency
of our responses. These examples illustrate the functional impor-
tance of complementary actions in the action–perception domain
(Graf et al., 2009), and they prompt us to examine themechanisms
involved in producing those responses.
Behavioral Studies of Complementary
Actions
Since the direct matching between observed and performed
actions is thought to occur automatically, when we observe an
action which differs from our intended action we have to inhibit
the tendency to imitate (Brass et al., 2005). While the mechanism
leading to automatic imitation is relatively well-studied (Heyes,
2011), it is less clear how this automatic tendency is brought under
control.
Evidence that task representation plays a pivotal role in shaping
our actions has been provided by a series of studies (Newman-
Norlund et al., 2007a,b; van Schie et al., 2008b; Poljac et al.,
2009) in which participants were explicitly instructed to prepare
imitative or complementary actions after viewing a virtual actor
grasp a manipulandum using either a precision grip (PG; i.e.,
opposition between the index finger and thumb) or a whole-
hand grasp (WHG; i.e., opposition of the thumb with the other
fingers). As expected, participants were faster at preparing their
response in imitative contexts if the action to be carried out was
congruent with what they had observed.When, instead, they were
expected to carry out complementary actions, they responded
faster when their action was dissimilar to the one they had just
observed. The task representation (imitative vs. complementary)
seems then to overrule long-term stimulus-response associations,
influencing the way that action–perception coupling takes place.
Further evidence concerning this flexible perception–action cou-
pling was produced by a 3D motion capture study (Ocampo and
Kritikos, 2010) in which reaching and grasping parameters of
congruent responses were found to improve in imitative contexts,
and incongruent responses were facilitated in complementary
contexts. Consistent with these findings, Longo et al. (2008)
demonstrated that also the level of action coding can be modified
(e.g., toward coding in terms of movements) depending on task
requirements. Taken together, these data challenge the idea that
action observation automatically leads to imitation in the observer
and suggest that, depending on the context, observed actions can
prime incongruent responses.
Recently, Sacheli et al. (2012, 2013) showed that participants
involved in face-to-face interactions can mutually adjust their
movements in time and space even in the absence of instruc-
tions to either imitate or perform a complementary response.
This demonstrates that priming does not strictly depend on task-
constrains, and that humans might indeed be able to actively
shift from imitative to complementary actions, thanks to neuro-
cognitive processes that still needs to be clarified.
Neuroimaging Studies of Complementary
Actions
Few studies have examined the neural circuitry behind joint
actions, and in particular the human mirror neuron system’s
(hMNS) involvement in complementary forms of social interac-
tion. Might the hMNS provide a substrate for complementary
actions? And if not, what role do other brain systems play?
In a pioneering experiment, the response of the hMNS was
specifically investigated in imitative and complementary action
contexts using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI;
Newman-Norlund et al., 2007a,b). Signals were recorded while
the participants prepared to grasp a manipulandum in one of two
ways—with a WHG or a PG—after they viewed an actor carrying
out that action. It was found that preparation for complementary
actions resulted in an increased blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) signal in the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and in the
bilateral inferior parietal lobule (IPL), two core components of the
mirror system (Figure 1). This finding can be explained in terms
of different kinds of mirror neurons: strictly congruent mirror
neurons, which respond to identical actions, both observed and
performed ones, and broadly congruent mirror neurons, which
respond to non-identical observed and performed actions and
objects linked to them (Fogassi and Gallese, 2002). It is also
possible that in the complementary condition, when participants
observe an action drawing attention to an object eliciting a differ-
ent action, an interplay takes place between mirror and canonical
neuronswith the latter responding both during the time the action
is being executed and also while the objects linked to those behav-
iors are perceived (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The need to
carry out a complementary action involving a different object
might then imply a combination of mirror and canonical neurons
coding for different types of actions at different times of the
sequence. The hypothesis that different classes of mirror neurons
serve to integrate observed and executed actions during comple-
mentary kinds of social interaction is certainly an appealing one.
Newman-Norlund et al. (2007a,b, 2008) also hypothesized
that a joint action could preferentially recruit right lateralized
components of the mirror system since right inferior frontal
activations are linked to inhibition processes (Brass et al.,
2005). Planning and executing complementary actions in this
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FIGURE 1 | Neuroimaging studies of complementary actions. A number
of studies have suggested that the right IFG (A) is not only involved when we
respond to the actions of others by doing the same as they do (imitation) but
also when responding with complementary actions (Newman-Norlund et al.,
2007a,b, 2008; Ocampo et al., 2011; Shibata et al., 2011). In contrast, others
hypothesize that the flexibility required during complementary actions requires
a large network (B) including the IFG, IPL, superior parietal lobule (SPL),
precentral gyrus, basal ganglia, middle and temporal occipital gyri, and
cerebellum to be involved in integrating one’s own actions to those of others
(Kokal et al., 2009; Kokal and Keysers, 2010).
framework would mean, first of all, actively inhibiting the
natural tendency to imitate observed actions. In the light of
recent debates revolving around mirror mechanisms (Gallese
and Sinigaglia, 2011; de Bruin and Gallagher, 2012), some have
theorized that mirror neurons transform perceptual information
regarding an intentional action in terms of the observer’s own
action possibilities (Gazzola et al., 2007). The idea that the
hMNS could link perceived actions with appropriate motor plans
was confirmed by an fMRI study designed by Ocampo et al.
(2011) who studied the neural activations underlying execution
of actions that were unlike the ones observed. As expected,
activity within the right IPL and right IFG—core regions of
the hMNS—was greatest in the imitative context when the
participants responded with actions that were similar to the hand
actions observed. Interestingly, activity within these regions also
increased when dissimilar actions were performed, indicating
that there are increased demands linked to remapping stimulus-
response associations (Figure 1A). Shibata et al. (2011) likewise
found that the right IFG was involved in mediating higher-order
action understanding linked to a complementary action request.
Overall, these findings seem to suggest that there are two separate
processes and that both are supported by fronto-parietal brain
regions. The first process operates at a simple motor level within
contexts that require similar responses. The second allows the
observer to inhibit those responses and to prepare an action that
is compatible with the task demands at hand.
A more integrated description of neural circuits underlying
complementary actions was recently outlined by Kokal et al.
(2009; Kokal and Keysers, 2010; Figure 1B). Participants in an
interactive fMRI study were instructed to carry out comple-
mentary and imitative actions in real-time cooperation with an
experimenter (“Joint Action”), by performing the same actions
individually (“Execution”), or by simply observing the exper-
imenter’s actions (“Observation”). This experiment raised our
understanding of social interactions to an entirely new level by
specifically mapping the contribution of the hMNS (i.e., common
voxels for both execution and observation) as well as the areas
specifically involved in the joint actions (i.e., voxels exceeding
the sum of execution and observation). The areas responsible for
this integration process were located bilaterally in the IFG, IPL,
precentral gyrus, superior parietal lobule, middle and temporal
occipital gyri, and cerebellum.
Two anatomically separate networks have thus been delineated:
one that would decipher observed and executed actions into a
single common code (Etzel et al., 2008) and another that would
integrate this information to successfully achieve common goals.
These findings show that although the hMNS plays a critical
role in translating all actions into a common code, their flexible
remapping seems to be performed elsewhere. It would seem then
that any potential discrepancy between an observed action and
a complementary response can be resolved flexibly in a two-step
manner. During the first step, the observed action is processed
in order to predict its goal. During the second, associations are
made between the action observed and the appropriate response
needed to accomplish a complementary goal. Crucially, Erlhagen
et al. (2006) proposed an anatomical model based on animal
studies differentiating direct (automatic) and flexible routes for
action–perception coupling. The model involves four intercon-
nected brain areas, namely the superior temporal sulcus (STS),
area PF (Brodmann area 7b), area F5, and the prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC). The STS-F5 connection, allowing for the matching
between a visual description of an action and its motor repre-
sentation, would represent the neural basis of the direct route
for the automatic imitation of an observed action. More impor-
tantly, when required, the flexible action–perception coupling is
realized in the model by the connection between the PF area and
the PFC through which goal representations from the PFC can
modulate and set the coupling between visual (STS) and motor
(F5) representations (Erlhagen et al., 2006).
Notably, the temporal course of the low- and high-level systems
interaction has long been debated.
If output from control systems guide and modulates the mirror
system, this would represent a top-down process. The STORM
model (social top-down response modulation) suggests that the
decision to imitate or to inhibit imitation initially draws on
social signals and is most likely supported by a brain network
including medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) and temporopari-
etal junction (TPJ), two core areas of the so-called Mentalizing
system, engaged when participants judge other people’s mental
state (Wang andHamilton, 2012;Hamilton, 2015). Recently, Cross
et al. (2013) have proposed a model for conflict processing in
case of incongruence between observed and executed actions.
When preparation to avoid imitation is not possible, medial
prefrontal regions (mPFC and anterior cingulate cortex) would
first detect imitative conflict and send information to anterior
insula which would process conflict resolution, suppressing the
unwanted motor activation. The hMNS would be therefore the
target of top-downmechanisms of conflict resolution. In contrast,
if the hMNS leads to an automatic tendency to imitate an observed
action and this information feeds up to a monitoring system, this
represents a bottom-up process (Brass et al., 2009). According to
Ubaldi et al. (2015; see also Barchiesi and Cattaneo, 2013), early
mirror responses (150 ms from onset of visual stimuli) would
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be followed by later rule-based non-mirror responses (300 ms).
These data seem to indicate that a fast bottom-up process medi-
ated by the dorsal visual stream produces automatic imitative
responses. Whereas rule-based visuomotor associations would be
mediated by a slower top-down system, relying on the PFC.
Neurophysiologic Studies of
Complementary Actions
Action observation automatically activates corresponding motor
representations in an observer, and the stronger support for this
process comes from single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (spTMS) over the primary motor cortex (M1) and con-
comitant electromyography (EMG; e.g., Fadiga et al., 1995). This
technique allows tomeasuremodulations in an observer’s cortico-
spinal (CS) excitability while he/she watches an agent performing
an action. A statistically significant increase in TMS-induced
motor evoked potentials (MEP) amplitudes in the corresponding
muscles indicates that observers are specifically attuned to the
observed action and at what time it does occur. The facilitation
of CS excitability provided the first physiological evidence for a
direct matching in humans between action perception and action
execution (for review, see Fadiga et al., 2005), andmade it possible
to explore motor system reactions in interactive contexts. A series
of recent neurophysiologic studies were designed to assess the
facilitation of CS excitability while participants observed video-
clips evoking imitative and complementary gestures (Sartori et al.,
2011b, 2012, 2013a,b,c). In one of these studies (Sartori et al.,
2012), TMS-induced MEPs were recorded from the participants’
handmuscles while they observed an actor grasping an object and
then unsuccessfully attempting to complete a task (e.g., pouring
coffee in a cup which was strategically placed out of her reach
but in the video foreground, close to the observer’s right hand).
An almost imperceptible movement of the actor’s hand was inter-
preted as a request to move the out-of-reach cup closer to the
actor so that she could complete the action (Figure 2). Notably,
the type of grasp the participant observed and the one that was
needed to complete the actor’s task were mismatched in all of the
videos (i.e., a WHG performed by the actor vs. a PG required of
the observer, and vice versa). As the participants were instructed
to remain motionless throughout the task, the degree to which
the motor system was activated provided an index of the CS
activity elicited by action preparation. Moreover, as no explicit
instructions were imparted to the participants, the experiment
uncovered spontaneous tendencies to fulfill an implicit request
embedded in a social interaction. This experiment was particu-
larly enlightening in view of the fact thatmost studies typically ask
participants to perform actions that are not associated with any
meaningful behavior in real-world settings or utilize paradigms
aiming to uncover dispositions formed during the execution of
the experimental task itself (e.g., in imitation vs. complementary
blocks) rather than spontaneous tendencies. Study results showed
that amatchingmechanism at the beginning of an action sequence
turned into a complementary one as soon as the request for a
reciprocal action became evident (functional shift). The muscle-
specificity of MEP recordings highlighted the interplay between
the initial tendency to resonate with what was observed and
FIGURE 2 | The functional shift. A fundamental requirement for successful
complementary actions is the capacity to smoothly and efficiently switch from
observing another person’s gestures to planning a corresponding reciprocal
action. TMS-induced MEPs were recorded from participants’ hand muscles in
response to observing an actor grasping an object and then trying vainly to
fulfill a task (e.g., pouring coffee) in a cup which was strategically placed out of
her reach but in the video foreground, close to the observer’s right hand
(Sartori et al., 2012, 2013b,c). The type of grasp observed and the one that
was required were reciprocally mismatched in all the videos (i.e., a WHG
performed by the actor vs. a PG requested of the observer, and vice versa).
the subsequent inclination to implicitly prepare for a dissimilar
complementary action (Figure 2).
At this point a new important question arose: at what point does
this functional switch occur? A new experiment was designed
in which TMS was delivered at five different timepoints corre-
sponding to five kinematic landmarks characterizing the observed
action (Sartori et al., 2013b,c). The most critical was the fourth
(T4) timepoint when the actor’s hand trajectory began to signif-
icantly move toward the out-of-reach object. A TMS pulse was
delivered precisely at that moment to investigate whether partic-
ipants were able to predict the actor’s trajectory even before the
action became explicit. The control condition that was designed
consisted in the actor bringing her hand back to its initial posi-
tion—with the out-of-reach object still visible in the foreground.
The results showed that the participants quickly discriminated
between an action driven by a social goal and one that was not,
simply by observing the kinematic cues signaling the direction
of the actor’s hand. These findings have direct implications with
regard to action representation theories because they suggest that
intention attribution (i.e., social vs. individual) is sensitive to
kinematic constraints. As different types of intentional actions
have distinctive motion signatures, observers appear to take note
of precocious differences in kinematics during action observation
in order to be able to predict the actor’s intentions (Kilner et al.,
2007; Sartori et al., 2009, 2011a; Becchio et al., 2010, 2012a,b;
Manera et al., 2011).
A Working Memory Hypothesis
A dual process seems then to underlie joint actions: a low-level
motor resonance analyzes and stores information on observed
actions, while a high-level systemwould flexibly integrate our and
others’ motor intentions and select the most appropriate response
and time course to achieve joint goals (van Schie et al., 2008a).
It can be hypothesized then that the hMNS’ function is similar
to that of a working memory, although specifically tailored for
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action. Mirroring the responses of others might be useful to con-
stantly track and monitor the interacting partners, and to support
temporal coordination and action planning (Colling et al., 2013)
while cognitive control systems come into play to distinguish self-
and other-related representation, to inhibit unwanted imitative
responses and to enforce self-generated actions (Brass et al., 2009;
Cross et al., 2013). As in the case of the working memory, distinct
elements would be kept on-line while others are being processed
(Gibson, 2000). We therefore suggest an extension of the pre-
vious models of imitation control involving a cross-talk and a
simultaneous activation of low- and high-level systems.
Complementary actions are the ideal way to test this topic.
During complex social interaction/s, the individual needs to
keep information relative to the observed action available while
contemporaneously attempting to process a response. In this
type of context, the mirror system may be involved in keeping
action-related information on hold to enable other brain areas
to extract the meaning of the action observed to achieve a joint
goal. Notably, observing another person’s actions priming for
an incongruent reaction can lead to a motor resonant response
in the observer’s corresponding muscles as well as a simulta-
neous preparation in different effectors necessary for achiev-
ing a complementary response (Sartori et al., 2015). The rela-
tion between observed and executed actions seems then to be
coordinated by a social associative memory which apparently
matches some actions to their natural social responses regard-
less of who is actually performing the action (Chinellato et al.,
2013). Under this model, there would be no difference between
congruent, incongruent and complementary responses, as long
as they have been associatively linked. In this vein, Catmur
et al., (2007; 2008; 2009; see also Heyes, 2001, 2011; Cooper
et al., 2013) have proposed that flexibility in action perception
coupling may be gained thanks to associative sequence learn-
ing (i.e., the ASL theory) developed during social interactions.
They strongly suggests that overlearned responses are able to
modulate the motor priming effect: when a specific behavior is
contingent on a non-matching behavior (e.g., extending the right
hand when observing a right hand), an incongruent association is
formed.
Conclusion
The research outlined here shows that motor resonance elicited by
action observation is modulated depending on its context: when
an observed gesture is socially relevant (i.e., there is an implicit or
explicit request) anticipatory complementary activations follow.
The assumption that observing an action automatically triggers
the inclination to imitate probably arose because most studies
did not explicitly challenge the automaticity or flexibility of the
visuomotor transformation process. The data outlined here have
contributed to shedding light on the functioning of the human
motor system in social contexts and on the types of social behavior
frequently occurring in real-world settings. From awider perspec-
tive, we can theorize that defining the conditions and the modal-
ities by which motor resonant responses to action observation
can be modulated may prove to have specific translational impli-
cations leading to the development of novel neuro-rehabilitation
protocols for patients with localized lesions to cortical motor
areas (e.g., ischemic stroke) and for pathologies such as autism
(Hamilton, 2015). More distant horizons may include developing
models of brain mechanisms underlying social interactions in the
effort to endow artificial agents such as robots with the ability
to perform meaningful complementary actions in response to
observed actions.
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